Vice President Sara Duterte’s impeachment trial has been a masterclass of legal principles and maxims, taught by some of the best and brightest legal minds the country has to offer. That being said, it has also exposed those who confidently speak on the law without fully understanding it—and they are being schooled in real time. In this article, we will discuss the doctrine of the “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree” and its proper application, as elucidated in the landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno.

By itself, a statement raised during the impeachment trial to wit: “Kung walang basehan ‘yung paglabas ng ebidensyang ‘yun, it is the fruit of the poisonous tree—you cannot use it,” makes sense. However, this statement was not made in a vacuum, and the context of the proceedings must be considered. It is crucial to recall that this statement was made while a debate was being held with regard to the issuance of subpoenas for the bank records, tax records, and Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) records of the Vice President and her husband, Manases Carpio. It is in this context that the doctrine of the “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree” was misapplied.

First, we must discuss what the doctrine means. In Philippine jurisprudence, this doctrine was first applied in the landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno. In this case, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks, and Karl Beck were officers of various corporations. The respondent prosecutors applied for, and respondent-judges issued, a total of 42 search warrants against the petitioners and their corporations. These warrants authorized the search of persons and premises, including offices, warehouses, and residences to seize books of accounts, financial records, and other documents. The Supreme Court ruled that the warrants for the residences are null and void as they are “general warrants” which failed to meet two constitutional requirements: (1) probable cause, since no specific offense was alleged,  and (2) particularity, because the description of “all business transactions,” regardless of legality, was overly broad. As such, the Court held that the articles obtained from the void warrant cannot be admissible as evidence. The Court expounded that excluding unlawfully acquired evidence is the only practical way to enforce the constitutional mandate against unreasonable searches and seizures. If the government is allowed to profit from its own lawless “official lawlessness,” the constitutional protection becomes a “form of words” without value.

Second, we must define what a subpoena is. Rule 21 of the Rules of Court provides that a subpoena is a legal order that requires a person to: (1) appear and testify at a court hearing, trial, investigation, or deposition and (2) bring documents or other evidence they have if the subpoena also orders them to do so, the latter called a subpoena ducem tecum.

Applying these concepts to the impeachment trial, particularly to the prosecution’s request of subpoenas, it is apparent that there was a misapplication of the doctrine. In fact, the prosecution’s very act of seeking subpoenas undermines the argument that the evidence would be illegally obtained as a subpoena is a lawful judicial process specifically designed to compel the production of evidence. Thus, if the subpoenas are validly issued, the evidence obtained through them is acquired through legal means and, absent any other legal infirmity, would be admissible in the proceedings.